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THE PARENT TRAP: USING THE GOOD
SAMARITAN DOCTRINE TO HOLD
PARENT CORPORATIONS DIRECTLY
LIABLE FOR THEIR NEGLIGENCE
As the harm which safely may be considered foreseeable to
the defendant changes with the evolving expectations of a
maturing society, so change the "special relationships" upon
which the common law will base tort liability for the failure
to take affirmative action with reasonable care)
A New Testament parable gives the name "Good Samaritan" to the
only passerby who stops to help a man who had been beaten and
starved.' Nearly two thousand years later, America's legal fictions—cor-
porations—are acquiring this magnanimous label by lending their
services to their subsidiaries, often gratuitously.' Along with the be-
nevolent public image that accompanies the "Good Samaritan" desig-
nation comes a host of legal responsibilities and potential liabilities.'
Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, often referred to
as the "Good Samaritan Doctrine," imposes a duty of care upon an
individual or organization who voluntarily undertakes to perform some
action to benefit a third party. 5
 Adopted by a majority of states, this
duty is based on the premise that even a volunteer must use due care
upon affirmatively undertaking a particular course of conduct and,
therefore, is liable to third persons who suffer physical harm from the
volunteer's negligent performance of the undertaking." Specifically,
section 324A provides:
1 Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1300-01 (Mass. 1984).
2 Luke 10:33 (King James).
3 See RESTATEMENT (S1:coNo) ut "bias § 324A (1965). This Restatement section applies to
undertakings lin consideration as well as those that are gratuitously provided. See id.
See id.
5 See id.
Most states have expressly adopted § 324A. See, e.g., Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 532 F. Supp. 1348, 1354 (D. Md. 1982); Ray v. Transamerica Ins. Go., 208 N.W.2d 610, 657
(Mich. 1973); Wright v. Scluam, 781 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Nev. 1989). Others have adopted a common
law cause of action containing language similar to the language used in § 324A. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Abbe Eng'g Co., 749 F.2(1 1131, 1132 ti.1 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that TexaS Supreme Court
has never expressly adopted § 324A but has addressed and followed its policy); Mullins v. Pine
Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331, 336 n.10 (Mass. 1983) (stating that Massachusetts's version of
1061
1062	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 37:1061
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of a third person or his things is
subject to liability to the third person for physical harm re-
sulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to [per-
form] his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk
of such harm,
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other
to a third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or
the third person upon the undertaking.'
As recently as twenty years ago, section 324A's Good Samaritan
Doctrine was a rarely used and relatively insignificant cause of action.'
Parties utilized section 324A in three limited contexts: employment,
landlord-tenant disputes and claims against municipalities and other
government entities.° In the employment arena, typical Good Samari-
tan claims included claims by injured employees against their workers'
compensation insurers for negligent inspections, 10 actions by general
contractors against their subcontractors for negligence," and suits by
employees against co-employees for failing to protect them from harm. 12
In the landlord-tenant context, tenants used section 324A against their
landlords for failing to provide adequate security or against building
inspectors for negligent inspections." Finally, individuals relied upon
the Good Samaritan Doctrine to hold government entities liable for
§ 324A differs from Restatement); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N,W.2d 801, 807 11,9
(Minn, 1979) (stating that Minnesota's requirements to impose special duty are similar to factors
set out in § 324A).
7 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A. Although the published text of § 324A uses the word
"protect" instead of "perform," this is apparently a typographical error. Hill v, United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 428 F.2d 112, 115 n.5 (5th Cir. 1970).
8 The limited applicability of § 324A, nearly always brought in conjunction with other theo-
ries of liability, suggests this premise.
9 See infra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
I° See, e.g., Huggins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 264 S.E.2d 191, 192 (Ga. 1980); Ray, 208 N.W.2d
at 657; Otto v. American Mut. Ins, Co., 361 A.2d 815, 819 (Pa. 1976).
II See, e.g., Simon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist, 202 N.W.2d 157, 169 (Neh. 1972); Quail Hollow
E. Condominium Ass'n v. Donald J. Scholz Co., 268 S.E.2d 12, 15 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
12 See, e.g., Craven v. Oggero, 213 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Iowa 1973); Miller v. Muscarelle, 170
A.2d 437, 451 (N J. 1961).
18 See, e.g., E.G. Rock, Inc. v. Dimly, 633 A.2d 485, 492-93 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); Speaker
v. Cates Co., 879 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tenn. 1994); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132, 139
(Wis. 1976).
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dangerous road conditions,H negligent inspections of airplanes,' 6 and
other dangerous conditions aggravated by negligent government in-
spections. 16
 In most of the above examples, the Good Samaritans'
undertakings that led to liability were often completed incident to
some statutorily imposed duty." Plaintiffs relied upon the regulatory
schemes requiring action by the Good Samaritans to successfully claim
that a special relationship existed between the Good Samaritans and
themselves, thus imposing a duty of care upon the actors.' 8
 Although
the existence of a special relationship is not explicitly mandated by
section 324A, plaintiffs were rarely successful in asserting Good Samari-
tan claims absent a showing that such a special relationship existed. 19
Today, typical special relationship cases such as those in the em-
ployment and landlord-tenant arenas are not the only forums for
imposing a duty under section 324A. 2° Courts no longer limit the class
of section 324A plaintiffs to only those who can prove the existence of
a special relationship. 21
 Consequently, the Good Samaritan Doctrine
has evolved from a little-used statute into a powerful tool that allows
individuals to impose liability upon parent corporations for their own
14
 See, e.g., Weyer v. Towner Cty., 565 F.2d 1001, 1009, 1010 (8th Cir. 1977); Matternes v. City
of Winston-Salem, 209 S.E.2d 481, 491 (N.C. 1974).
15 See, e.g., United Scottish Ins. v. United States, 692 F.2d 1209, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd,
467 U.S. 797 (1984); Zahala Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1145 (1st Cir. 1978);
Johnston v. United Stales, 461 E Supp. 991, 993 (N.D. Fla. 1978), affd, 603 F.2d 858 (5th Cie
1979).
16 See, e.g., Toppi v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 1277, 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (plaintiff sued
government fin.
 injuries resulting from explosives after safety inspector had given plaintiff mis-
leading advice concerning disposal of explosives); Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 545 1 1.2d 13, 19
(Wash. 1975) (plaintiffs sued state for damages resulting from avalanche about which state was
previously warned).
17
 See, e.g., Clernerrte, 567 F.2d at 1145 (FAA weight and flight crew regulations); 7'oppi, 327 F.
Supp. at 1278 (regulations regarding disposal of explosives); Matternes, 209 S.E.2d at 491 (regu-
lations governing city's maintenance of streets).
18 See, e.g„ Clemente, 567 F.2d at 1145 (FAA weight and flight crew regulations); Toppi, 527 E
Stipp. at 1278 (regulations regarding disposal of explosives); Matternes, 209 S.E.2d at 491 (regu-
lations governing city's maintenance of streets).
19
 "Typical" special relationships include landlord-levant, guest-host and employer-employee.
See supra notes 13, 14.
See, e.g., State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 19, 1995)
(opinion not published) (imposing a duty on tobacco companies); Mahlum v. Dow Corning
Corp., No, CV93-05941 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Oct. 30, 1995) (opinion not published) (imposing duty
on parent corporation of breast implant manufacturer).
21
 Section 324A is still based on an assumption of a "special" duly by the defendant, as
opposed to a legal duty based On general tort law. See Philip Morris, No. C1-94-8565. Tliz courts
have become more willing to apply ji 324A where the parties do not have a typical "special
relationship," and conclude that the defendant nevertheless owes a "special duty" to the plaintiff.
See id.
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tortious conduct in providing assistance to their subsidiaries. 22 In the
past, plaintiffs seeking to impose liability upon parent corporations
had to overcome the high burden imposed by traditional corporate
veil-piercing standards.23 This Note examines the use of section 324A
as a viable alternative to piercing the corporate veil for imposing direct
liability on a corporation for its negligent acts, particularly in products
liability situations. 24
Part I discusses the elements of a section 324A claim and examines
the evolution of section 324A in the parent-subsidiary context. 25 Part
II examines the most recent forum for section 324A liability—breast
implant litigation against Dow Chemical as the parent corporation of
Dow Corning. 26 Part III provides a discussion of the benefits of section
324A, an examination of the policy considerations behind its use in
the corporate tort liability context and a look at the problems with
section 324A and its modified versions. 27 Part IV looks at the future of
the Good Samaritan Doctrine as an avenue of imposing tort liability
on corporations. 28
I, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SECTION 324A
Section 324A of the Restatement is rooted in Glanzer v. Shepard,
the seminal Good Samaritan case in which the Court of Appeals of
New York held that one who assumes to undertake an action, even
though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting
carefully.29 In Glanzer, the plaintiffs found that the beans they had
purchased weighed 11,854 pounds less than the weight certified by the
public weigher. 3° The plaintiffs brought action against the public weigher,
22 See, e.g., id.; Mablum, No. G1193-05941:
23 See generally Andrew J. Natale, Note, Expansion of Parent Corporate Shareholder Liability
Through the Good Samaritan Doctrine—A Parent Corporations Duty to Provide a Safe Workplace for
Employee.s. of Its Subsidiary, 57 U. CIN. L. lbw. 717, 719-22 (1988).
21 The Good Samaritan Doctrine is a means of imposing direct liability on a parent corpo-
ration rather than indirect liability as in a corporate veil piercing situation. A cause of action
under § 324A (hies not involve an assertion of derivative liability but one of direct liability because
it is based on the actions of the defendant itself. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab.
Ling., 887 F. Stipp. 1455, 1460 (N.D. Ala. 1995). Furthermore, the standards for piercing the
corporate veil are more difficult to satisfy than the requirements for § 324A. See infra notes
207-212 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 29-129 and accompanying text.
21 ' See infra notes 130–Si and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 182-282 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 283-99 and accompanying text.
29 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922).
2)) Id. at 275.
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who had been paid by the bean seller."' The intermediate appellate
court reversed the trial court's decision and decided for the public
weigher, relying on the lack of privity of contract between the plaintiff's
and the defendant. ;z On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals rea-
soned that by undertaking the task of weighing, the defendant assumed
a duty to weigh carefully for the benefit of all to whom the weighers
rendered their services." Justice Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the
court, also discussed the importance of foreseeability in this type of
action, noting that the controlling circumstance is not the character
of the consequence but the consequence's proximity or remoteness in
the thought and purpose of the actor.'" The court held, thus, that one
owes a duty of reasonable care not only to those with whom he is bound
by contract, but also to those who rely on the individual's actions. 35
The New York Court of Appeals was the first court to impose a
duty upon one who renders a service gratuitously." The American Law
Institute codified this legal principle in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, published in 1965. 17
 Since the New York Court of Appeals held
that a duty can arise in the absence of contract or consideration, the
Good Samaritan's duty has evolved beyond the bounds of those cases
that required a special relationship between plaintiff and defendant."8
A. Negligent Performance of an Undertaking
—the Elements
To sustain a claim of negligent performance of an undertaking
under section 324A, a plaintiff must first show an affirmative under-
taking by the defendant to benefit a third party." Second, a plaintiff
must establish negligence on the part of the defendant in discharging
that undertaking.'" Thus, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
assumed and breached his duty to perform the undertaking in a
non-negligent manner.'" Additionally, the plaintiff must prove the ex-
istence of one of three possible elements that establish the plaintiff's
connection to the defendant's undertaking. 42




 Id. at 276.
31 Glanzer, 135 N.E. at 276.
3 •" Id. at 277,
36
 See id. at 276.
37 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A.
3H See 2 Fowt.r.rt V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 1048 (1956),
33 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A.
°See In re All Maine Asbestos Litig., 581 F. Stipp. 963, 978 (D. Me. 1984).
41 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A.
42 Id.
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prove that the Good Samaritan's failure to exercise reasonable care
increased the risk of harm." Second, the plaintiff may alternatively
prove that the Good Samaritan undertook to perform a duty owed by
another to the plaintiff." Or, third, the plaintiff may prove that the
plaintiff suffered because the plaintiff or another relied upon the
Good Samaritan's undertaking." Requiring a clear connection be-
tween the Good Samaritan and the plaintiff distinguishes a section
324A claim from an ordinary negligence claim.
1. Increasing the Risk of Harm
The first element of a section 324A claim is satisfied if the actor's
negligent performance of an undertaking increases the risk of physical
harm to a third person." For example, if a parent corporation provides
faulty health and safety information to its subsidiary and an employee
of the subsidiary is later injured as a result of this information, the
parent corporation may be liable for increasing the risk of harm to the
plaintiff pursuant to section 324A(a). 47 Litigants commonly use the
increased risk of harm condition to prove liability in cases where
employees or independent contractors negligently perform their du-
ties, so as to create or increase a risk of harm to the litigants:"
2. Undertaking a Duty Owed by Another to a Third Person
A second situation in which a plaintiff can hold a party liable
under the Good Samaritan Doctrine is when, in affirmatively under-
taking to render services for another, the actor has undertaken a duty
that the other party owes to a third person." For example, where a
parent corporation assumes the duty of training and supervising the




See RESTATEMENT, .supra note 3, § 324A(a).
17 See Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 532 F. Supp. 1348,1354,1355-56 (D. Md. 1982).
48 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A cost. c; see LaFond v. United States, 781 F.2d 153,154
(8th Cir. 1986) (pedestrian claimed that government's failure to adequately clear path outside
post office increased risk of harm to third persons); In re Sabin Oral Polio Vaccine Prod. Liab.
Litig., 774 E Supp. 952,954-55 (0. Md. 1991), affil, 984 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1993) (parents who
contracted polio after children received polio vaccine claimed government was negligent and
court held defendant increased risk of harm to those vaccinated and to plaintiffs); Figueroa v.
Evangelical Covenant Church, 698 F. Supp. 1408,1412-14 (N.D. Iii. 1988), affd, 879 F.2d 1427
(7th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff abducted from parking lot claimed owner's failure to provide adequate
security increased risk of harm).
49 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A(h) & cult. d.
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parent has undertaken a duty owed by the subsidiary to its employees
and all consumers of its products."
3. Reliance upon the Undertaking
A third situation in which a plaintiff can hold an actor liable for
negligent performance of an undertaking occurs when a plaintiff suf-
fers harm because of reliance by the recipient of the Good Samaritan's
services or the third party plaintiff upon the defendant's undertaking.'''
For example, where a consumer-plaintiff or a subsidiary corporation's
reliance led either party to forgo other remedies or precautions against
a risk, the subsidiary's parent corporation becomes subject to liability
for harm suffered by the plaintiff because of the risk.' 2 Thus, if a parent
corporation provides a subsidiary corporation with safety standards
and the subsidiary promulgates those standards in reliance upon the
parent corporation's expertise and experience in this particular indus-
try, the parent corporation is subject to liability to the subsidiary's
employee who is injured as a result of a failure of the parent corpora-
tion's promulgated safety standards to protect that employee."
4. Modified Versions of Section 324A
Some states have modified the elements required to sustain a
successful cause of action under section 324A. 54
 In Massachusetts, for
example, the degree of negligence that the plaintiff must prove de-
pends upon the nature of the undertaking." While the Restatement
explicitly states that section 324A applies to gratuitous undertakings
and undertakings for consideration, Massachusetts modified section
324A such that Good Samaritans are not liable for their gratuitous
undertakings."
51) See Boyer v. Empiregas, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 82H, 832 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
51 RESTATEMENT, SUPEa note 3, § 324A(c). Although the third party is generally the party
filing suit, the reliance element does not require that the third party relied on the parent
corporation. See id. & cmt. e. Rather, as long as the subsidiary relied on the parent corporation
and the plaintiff suffered because of the subsidiary's reliance, § 324A(c) is satisfied. See id.
52 Id. § 324A cmt. e.
is 	 Heinrich, 532 F. Stipp. at 1351.
54 See Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331, 336 n.10 (Mass. 1983); Cracraft v. City
of Si. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806-07, 807 n.9, n.11 (Minn. 1979); Eisman v. State, 511 N.E.2d
1128, 1135 (N.Y. 1987). For further discussion of Massachusetts, New York and Minnesota's
modifications of § 324A, see infra notes 54-92 and accompanying text.
55 See Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 336 n.10.
56 See id. (noting that Massachusetts treats gratuitous undertakings differently than the
Restatement). Good Samaritans may be held liable for gratuitous undertakings only if they are
grossly negligent, See id.
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In 1983, in Mullins v. Pine Manor College, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that a college owed a duty to its students
to provide them with security and that the college's negligence in
performing that duty was the proximate cause of the student-plaintiff's
injuries.57 In Mullins, a female student at Pine Manor College was
raped on campus by an unidentified assailant. 58
 The student brought
action against the college for the injuries she suffered as a result of the
rape. 59
 The court reasoned that colleges generally undertake to protect
their students from criminal acts of third parties. 6° The court observed,
furthermore, that the college did not provide this service gratuitously."'
Rather, because students were charged for security service through
tuition or dormitory fees, this protection formed an indispensable part
of the bundle of services that colleges afford their students. 62 Addition-
ally, the court noted that Massachusetts distinguishes gratuitous under-
takings from those done for consideration. 63 The court explained that
to impose liability for gratuitous undertakings, plaintiffs must prove
gross negligence on the part of the Good Samaritan. 64 Thus, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that, under section 324A,
colleges owe a duty to their students to use reasonable care to protect
them from criminal acts of third persons.°
In New York, a plaintiff seeking to impose liability under the Good
Samaritan Doctrine must satisfy an additional requirement not found
in section 324A. 6" New York requires a plaintiff to prove the existence
of a misrepresentation or nondisclosure on the part of the defendant.
that misleads the plaintiff to his or her detriment.° The plaintiff must
satisfy this requirement in addition to the three elements of section
324A discussed above. 68
In 1987, in Eisman v. State, the New York Court of Appeals held
that a state university's alleged negligence involved no breach of a duty
57 Id. at 337.
" Id. at 333.
roi
60 Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 336.
6 ' Id.
62 Id. The Supreme Judicial Court confusingly refers to undertakings done for consideration
as "voluntary" undertakings. See Pierre v. United States, 741 F. Stipp. 306, 309 (D. Mass. 1990)
(citing Mullins, 449 N.E.„2c1 at 336) ("undertaking is voluntary but not gratuitous if it is an
'indispensable part of a bundle of services' for which consideration had been given").
63 Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 336 ti.10.
64 Id.
65
 Jd. at 337.
"I' See Eisman, 511 N.E.2d at 1135.
67 Id.; see In re Silicone Breast Implant Litig., N.Y. L.J., Sept. 27, 1995, at 25 (N.Y. Sup. CO.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A.
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owed to a deceased student.'' In Eisman, a state college accepted an
ex-felon with a history of drug abuse and criminal conduct into its
special program for disadvantaged high school graduates. 7" While at.
the college, the ex-felon befriended the decedent, a fellow student with
whom he shared an apartment. 7 ' The ex-felon subsequently raped and
murdered the decedent at their apartment. 72 The decedent's estate
brought action against the State of New York for negligence due to the
prison physician's failure to inform the college and its students of the
ex-felon's medical history, and against the college for negligence in
admitting the ex-felon or failing to restrict his activity in accordance
with the risk he presented. 73 The court reasoned that because foresee-
ability does not determine duty, the prison physician who completed
the ex-felon's physical examination report did not owe a duty to each
member of the college community to search out and disclose his
patient's medical past. 74 The court further explained that liability in
negligence is based on a misrepresentation or nondisclosure on the
part of the defendant that led the person to whom it was made, the
college in this case, to forego action that it might otherwise have taken
for the protection of the plaintiff. 75 The court noted that as a policy
concern, the prison physician should not be held to limitless liability
to an indeterminate class of persons. 76 The physician did not undertake
a duty to the college community and he did not know, nor should he
have known, that his report would be relied on by the plaintiff or other
individual members of the college coinmunity. 77 The New York Court
of Appeals concluded that the physician did not owe a duty to the
plaintiff or the college and, therefore, the State was not liable for
negligent performance of an undertaking. 78
Like New York, Minnesota has modified the required elements of
a section 324A claim. 79 In fact, the Supreme Court of Minnesota does
69 511 N.E.2d at 1136.
711 Id. at 1130-31.
71 Id. at 1132.
72 /d. The ex-felon also murdered one of his other roommates and hillicted serious injuries
on a third roommate. Id.
73 Id.
74 Eisman, 511 N.E.2d at 1134-35.
75 1d. at 1135 (citing W. PAGE KEETON FE AL., PROSSER AND KEE'l'ON ON '11-1E LAW OF TORTS
§ 33, at 207 (5th ed. 1984)). This dicta contains the most significant aspect of this case for
purposes of this note, imposing an additional requirement. for liability for negligent performance




76 Crarraft, 279 N.W.2d at 806-07,807 n.9, n.11,
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not even recognize one of the subsections of 324A." In Minnesota,
undertaking to perform another's duty owed to a third person is
insufficient to create a duty of care in an actor. 81 The Minnesota Court
also added two elements that can create a duty of care: i) an ordinance
or statute that sets forth mandatory acts clearly designed for the pro-
tection of a particular class of persons or ii) actual knowledge of a
dangerous condition. 82 Finally, Minnesota modified the reliance ele-
ment by adding that the reasonable reliance must be based on specific
actions or representations that cause the plaintiffs to forego other
alternatives of protecting themselves. 83
In 1979, in Cra craft v. City of St. Louis Park, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota held that none of the connection elements existed so as to
create a special duty on the part of a city toward individual members
of the public." In Cracrail, a 55-gallon drum of a highly flammable
liquid ignited on property in close proximity to a high schoo1. 8' As a
result of the explosion, two boys died and a third boy received severe
burns over 50% of his body.86 The city fire inspector had inspected the
entire premises about six weeks prior to the explosion and failed to
notice the drum.'? The injured parties brought action against the city
alleging that the city inspector negligently failed to discover a fire code
violation on the premises." The court discussed four factors that it
would consider to determine whether a municipality assumed a duty
to act for the protection of others." These factors tend to impose a
duty of care on the defendant: actual knowledge of the dangerous
condition; reasonable reliance by persons on the defendant's repre-
8° See id. at 806-07.
'See id. The Supreme Court of Minnesota does nut explicitly preclude undertaking an-
other's duty as a potential theory of liability. See id. Nevertheless, although the court notes that
its list of factors is not exhaustive, the conspicuous absence of a factor similar to § 324A(h)
suggests that the court does not intend to recognize this element as a theory of liability. See id.
at 806-07,807 n,9, n.1
Id. at 800-07. The court's utilization of actual knowledge of' the dangerous condition to
impose a duty inight he specific to municipalities. See id. at 806.
83 Id. at 807. This is similar to New York's requirement of a misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure on the part of the defendant t hat misleads the plaintiff to her detriment. See id.; Eisman,
511 N.E.2d at 1135.
"279 N.W.2d at 806.
85 id. at 803.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 802.
ss Cratrafi, 279 N.W.2d at 806-07. The court notes that this list is not exhaustive, but the
court Fails to express whether these four factors are balanced or whether each factor must be
satisfied. See id. The court's language and comparison of these factors to the subsections of § 324A
suggest that each factor is independently sufficient to create a duty of care in the actor. See id.
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sentations and conduct that causes the persons to forego other alter-
natives of protecting themselves; existence of an ordinance or statute
that sets forth mandatory acts clearly designed for the protection of a
particular class of persons; and increasing the risk of harm by failing
to use clue care."" The court applied these factors to the facts of this
case and determined that the evidence failed to show that a duty was
assumed or a special duty was statutorily created." Thus, the court held
that merely undertaking an inspection was insufficient to create a duty
of care in the actor."2
B. Negligent Performance of an Undertaking—the Cases
The cases discussed below in which the litigants have used the
Good Samaritan Doctrine to impose liability on a corporate parent are
still very different from the recent Good Samaritan Doctrine cases,
such as the breast implant and tobacco cases, where special relation-
ships did not exist between the parties."' First, few of the plaintiffs in
the cases discussed below succeeded on their section 324A claims."'
Furthermore, many of the cases discussed below are reminiscent of
early section 324A cases, containing negligent inspections, employer-
employee relationships and government defendants." 5 Only with the
breast implant litigation did the Good Samaritan Doctrine begin to
succeed in the non-special relationship context of corporate tort liabil-
ity, clearing the path for a new generation of section 324A claims."''
These late-generation cases illustrate the evolution of the tort of neg-
ligent performance of an undertaking, as it developed from a rare
9° Id. 'I'he second and fourth fhetors are analogous to § 324A(a) & (c), with the Supreme
Court of Minnesota requiring more specific reliance than § 324A(c)'s general reliance. See id. at
806-07, 807 n.9, n.I RKSTATEM ENT, supra note 3, § 324A(a), (c). The Minnesota court's first
condition creating a duty, actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, and third condition
creating a duty, by statute or ordinance, arc not present in § 324A, See Cracrryt, 279 NIA'.2r1 at
806-07.
91 Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 807-08.
92 Id, at 806. This holding is undoubtedly contingent on the Minnesota Supreme Court's
unwillingness to recognize § 324A(6), undertaking a fluty owed by another to a third party,
93 Compare infra notes 97-129 and accompanying text with infra notes 292-99 and accompa-
nying text.
" See infra notes 97-104, 113-21 and accompanying text. These particular cases were chosen
lOr background because of their role in shaping § 324A, not because of the plaintiffs' success rate.
95 See infra text accompanying notes 97-129.
99 See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab, Ling., 887 V, Supp. 1455, 1460 (N.D.
Ala. 1995), vacating prior order granting summary judgment, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant;
Prod. Liab. Litig. (MDL 926), 837 F. Stipp, 1128, 1142 (N.D. Ala. 1993); Mahlum v. Dow Corning
Corp., No. CV93-05941 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Oct. 30, 1995),
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feline into a ferocious lion roaming the corporate jungle, devouring
negligent companies.
In Rick v. RIX Corp., in 1981, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan held that, under section 324A, a
parent corporation was not liable to its subsidiary's employee for per-
sonal injuries because the parent did not undertake to provide services
pursuant to an agreement or with the intention of benefitting the
subsidiary corporation or its employees. 97 The plaintiff in Rick worked
for the defendant-parent's subsidiary corporation as a truck driver."
While driving his truck, the vehicle allegedly overturned on its right
side."" The plaintiff claimed that he was injured and left totally and
permanently disabled." The plaintiff contended that the defendant-
parent, by undertaking to provide management services in accident
prevention and safety to the subsidiary corporation, incurred a duty to
the plaintiff as an employee of the subsidiary to exercise reasonable
care in accordance with section 324A while providing these services.'"'
The court reasoned that the evidence must show that the defendant
intended to render services for the benefit of the subsidiary corpora-
tion or its employees, not merely that either of these parties received
a benefit.' 02 The court concluded that although the subsidiary may
have benefitted from the parent's services, an agreement or intention
to benefit the subsidiary or its employees is required to establish an
undertaking under the Good Samaritan Doctrine." Thus, the court
held that absent evidence showing that the parent corporation under-
took to provide services to its subsidiary, the defendant-parent had
no duty to an employee of the subsidiary corporation under section
324A. 104
In Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., in 1982, the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland held that a corporate
defendant was potentially liable under section 324A(a) or section 324A(c)
if it provided its subsidiary with health and safety information and
117 535 F. Supp. 39,46-47 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
" Id. at 40. Martlack was a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant RLC Corporation. See id.
99 Id.
tan 1d.
11 ' Id. at 41.
1 °2 Rick, 535 F. Supp. at 93. Additionally, the court expressly stated that evidence that benefits
were conferred upon the subsidiary or its employees was insufficient to establish a duty if the
parent's conduct was 'consistent with an intention primarily to serve its own purposes." Id. at 95.
The court also noted that an agreement in which the parent undertook to provide the services
in question to the subsidiary would establish that the parent corporation owed a duty to the
plaintiff. Id.
1 °3 Id. at 47.
104 Id.
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services." In Heinrich, an employee allegedly contracted an occupa-
tional disease while working at a tire manufacturing plant.'" The plant
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant-parent corporation.'" 7
The employee and his wife brought an action against the parent cor-
poration for damages sustained as a result of the occupational dis-
ease.'" The plaintiffs claimed that the disease arose as a result of the
defendant-parent's negligence in providing the subsidiary with health
and safety information and services.'"`' The court first eliminated un-
dertaking another's duty to a third person as a possible avenue of relief,
reasoning that liability under this condition arises in the workplace
setting only if the actor's undertaking was intended to be in lieu of,
rather than a supplement to, the subsidiary's own duty of care to its
employees."° In determining whether the plaintiff stated a claim for
relief based on increasing the risk of harm or reliance upon the
undertaking, the court relied on a policy argument that a parent
corporation should not be shielded from tort liability when rendering
services to a subsidiary for economic gain but should he regarded as
any other information-supplying entity, thus subject to liability under
section 324A."' The court thus held that the plaintiffs' allegations that
the parent corporation negligently provided health and safety infor-
mation to the subsidiary were sufficient to state a section 324A claim. 112
In Muniz v. National Can Culp., in 1984, the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a parent corporation was not
liable for injuries sustained by an employee of its subsidiary corpora-
tion because the plaintiff failed to show proof of a positive undertaking
by the parent corporation to ensure safety at its subsidiary's plant." 3
In Muniz, an employee claimed that he was injured as a result of
continuous exposure to toxic lead fumes at his place of employment.' 14
The plaintiff sought relief from his employer's parent corporation."'
The parent corporation's involvement with industrial safety at its sub-
105 532 F. Stipp, at 1354.
101' Id, at 1350.
107 Id.
108 1,1,
109 Id. The plaintiffs expressly contended that they were not seeking to pierce the subsidiary
plant's corporate veil. Id. at 1351. Rather, all of the plaintiffs' legal theories were premised on
duties allegedly owed to the plaintiff's by Goodyear, the defendant and corporate parent. ld.
11 " Heinrich, 532 F. Supp. at 1355.
Id. at 1356.
1121d,
1 ' 3 737 F.2c1 145, 146, 148 (1st Cir. 1984). The Muniz court also noted that neither mere
concern nor minimal contact about safety matters creates a duty to ensure a sale working
environment for the employees of a subsidiary corporation. Id. at 148.
"4 Id. at 147.
115/d.
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sidiary corporation included the issuance of general safety guidelines
and assistance with specific safety matters upon request by the subsidi-
ary's local management." 6 The court reasoned that to establish a duty,
the plaintiff must show that the parent agreed to provide the service
or that the parent intended to confer benefits on the subsidiary, either
for a fee or gratuitously."' Moreover, the court noted that conduct
designed with an intention to solely or primarily serve the parent's own
purposes does not create a duty." 8 The court found that the plaintiff
failed to show that the parent assumed responsibility for safety at the
subsidiary or that the subsidiary relied on the parent by abandoning
its own safety measures. 19 The court concluded that the parent-defen-
dant did not affirmatively undertake to provide a safe working environ-
ment at the subsidiary corporation.'" The First Circuit, therefore, held
that the parent corporation's concern with safety matters did not rise
to the level of a positive undertaking, and for this reason, the defen-
dant was not liable to an employee of the subsidiary corporation under
section 324A.P2 '
In Johnson v. Abbe Engineering Co., in 1984, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a parent corporation had a
duty to protect employees of a subsidiary corporation where the sub-
sidiary relied on the expertise of the parent's safety division. 122 In
Johnson, two employees were severely burned in an explosion and fire
that occurred during the course of their employment.'" Using a sec-
tion 324A claim, the plaintiffs were successful in their trial against the
parent corporation of the wholly owned subsidiary-employer. 124 The
court first addressed whether the parent corporation had a duty to
protect the subsidiary's employees. 125 The court reasoned that the
parent corporation's inspection of the subsidiary's entire plant for
nsid
117 /d. at 149.
" 5 Muniz, 737 F.2d at 149.
"9 Id.; see RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A.
12(1 Muniz, 737 F.2d at 149,
121 Muniz, 737 F.2d at 149.
iz2 749 F.2d 1131, 1134 (5th Cr.i 1984).
123 Id. at 1132. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff's were pouring flammable solvents
from 55-gallon drums into a large grinder. Id. The prescribed procedures for pouring the solvents
involved laying the drums on their sides, opening them, and allowing the chemical to flow into
a funnel in the middle of the second floor balcony on which the plaintiff's worked. Id. It was
undisputed that the plaintiffs were following the prescribed procedures when the accident
occurred. Id.
124 Id. The opinion implies that while the subsidiary-employer was initially named as a
defendant, it was later dismissed prior to trial. See id.
125 Id. at 1133.
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conformity to safety practices and procedures was an affirmative un-
dertaking that established a duty on the part of the defendant.'''' The
court then engaged in a proximate cause analysis.'" The court noted
that the plaintiff satisfied the reliance element because the subsidiary's
plant manager relied upon the parent's safety representatives for acci-
dent prevention and safety training. 128 The Fifth Circuit held, thus, that
a parent corporation was liable under section 324A because it under-
took safety inspections of the subsidiary's plant and lulled the subsidi-
ary into a false sense of security concerning safety at the plant. 129
II. BREAST IMPLANT LITIGATION AGAINST DOW CHEMICAL—AN
IDEAL FORUM FOR SECTION 324A
On April 25, 1995, Judge Pointer of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied Dow Chemical's
motion for summary judgment with respect to all direct liability claims
by breast implant plaintiffs against the corporation, including the
plaintiffs' Good Samaritan based claims.' 3° The plaintiff's' claims against
Dow Chemical proved to be crucial when Dow Corning filed for bank-
ruptcy protection soon after Judge Pointer's decision, leaving Dow
Chemical as the only viable defendant for plaintiffs with Dow Corning
breast implantsP 1 The court, in In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants
Products Liability Litigation, noted that in 1942, Corning and Dow
Chemical agreed to create a corporation in which they would each
serve as Fifty percent shareholders, with Corning supplying their sili-
cone technology and Dow Chemical supplying their knowledge of
chemical processing and manufacturing.'" Dow Corning was incorpo-
rated the following year.'" In 1948, Dow Chemical scientists published
12fi Id.; cf. Hernandez v. Union Carbide Corp., 642 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (D.P.R. 1986) (duty
was not established where subsidiary did not delegate duty of implementing safety measures to
parent). Notably, the Manager of Accident Prevention and Safety Training at the parent corpo-
ration testified that he knew of the procedures followed by the plaintiffs and was aware that
explosive and highly flammable solvents were being used. Hernandez, 642 F. Supp. at 1002,
127 Johnson, 749 E2c1 at 1133. The court looked at the conditions outlined in § 324A(a), (b)
& (c) that satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of proving proximate cause. See id.; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 3, § 324A.
125Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1133-34.
129
155 in re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1455, 1463 (N.D. Ala.
1995), vacating prior order granting summary judgment, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod.
Liab. Litig. (MDL 926), 837 F Stipp. 1128, 1142 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
131 See infra note 192 and iiccompanying text.
152 887 F. Supp. at 1457. At the time of the litigation, Corning and Dow Chemical each
remained 50% shareholders. Id.
Id. Dow Corning was incorporated in Michigan in February 1993. Id.
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the results of their initial tests of silicone products, stating that they
were very low in toxicity and that "finished silicone resins are physi-
ologically inert and present no hazards."' 34
 Although the article related
to the handling of commercial silicones, it has been cited as spawning
interest in the use of silicones in medical products.' 35
Dow Chemical performed the toxicological tests on certain sili-
cone compounds, arranged and directed outside research on behalf
of Dow Corning, analyzed outside research results and for many years
made recommendations to Dow Corning regarding future silicone
testing.'s6 In 1970, after Dow Corning had been marketing breast implants
for six years, the only toxicology tests Dow Corning retained in their
files regarding the fluid contained in breast implants were those con-
ducted by Dow Chemical.'" Until the early 1970s, Dow Corning did
not even have its own toxicology lab.' 38
 Even after Dow Corning created
its own toxicology lab, Dow Corning frequently sought input from Dow
Chemical scientists on their silicone research.' 39 Additionally, Dow Corn-
ing had access to and used Dow Chemical's equipment, facilities, lab
animals and personnel in conducting Dow Corning toxicology tests on
silicone for use in breast implants.' 4"
Tests conducted by both Dow Chemical and its subsidiary Dow
Corning prior to and after the introduction of breast implants in 1964
revealed that some silicones, including some used in breast implants,
were not wholly inert but had some biologically active properties.•
Specifically, the studies revealed that low molecular weight silicones
could affect the immune system and that certain silicone fluids, such
as the gel contained in about eighty percent of breast implants, had
estrogenic effects. 142
 Nevertheless, Dow Chemical scientists continued
to assure Dow Corning that the adverse reactions were due to other





 In re Silicone, 887 F. Supp. at 1457-58. Although Dow Corning conferred with outside
consultants, these toxicology tests were not on file in Dow Corning's library. Id.
1Yln Id. at 1458.
1 " Id. During Dow Corning's start-up period, several Dow Chemical scientists transferred to
Dow Corning and later returned In Dow Chemical. Id. Many of these individuals researched and
tested silicone breast implants during their employment at Dow Corning and returned to Dow
Chemical with a great deal of information concerning the risks and hazards associated with the
silicone contained in breast implants. Id.
nu Id.
141 Id.
14'.4 In re Silicone, 887 F. Supp. at 1458.
"3 Id.
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In 1975, Dow Chemical and Dow Corning entered into a trade
name and trademark agreement.'" This agreement allowed Dow Corn-
ing to continue to use Dow Chemical's name as a part of its name. 145
The agreement provided that Dow Corning would submit specimens
of its products to Dow Chemical upon request and permit Dow Chemi-
cal to inspect Dow Corning's premises to examine the quality of Dow
Corning's products. 14"
Furthermore, beginning in the early 1960s, Dow Chemical pur-
chased interests in an Italian pharmaceutical company called Lepetit,
eventually owning over ninety-nine percent of the company. 147 Lepetit
promoted, sold and distributed Dow Corning's breast implants.'" Lepetit
continued to distribute implants until 1992. 14" Thus, in addition to its
activities in product development, Dow Chemical was deeply involved
with the marketing and distribution of breast implants.'"
These facts led the court to deny Dow Chemical's motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs' negligent undertaking claim. 151 The court first
addressed whether Dow Chemical undertook to perform services for
Dow Corning that Dow Chemical should have recognized as necessary
for the protection of third persons, specifically, breast implant recipi-
ents. 152 The court reasoned that the silicone testing performed by Dow
Chemical, Dow Chemical's knowledge that Dow Corning lacked a
toxicology lab and was therefore relying on the information it provided
to them, and Dow Chemical's awareness of the possible risks associated
with the silicones contained in breast implants imposed a duty on Dow
Chemical that would otherwise not exist.'" Furthermore, because Dow
Corning could have reasonably foreseen that its testing was being
relied upon to develop products that would be implanted in humans,
Dow Chemical had a duty to use due care in providing Dow Corning
1+1 Id.
145 Id .
146 Id. at 1458-59. The agreement also required that Dow Corning's products that use Dow
Chemical's name be "of a nature and quality that. is acceptable to Dow [Chemical] and shall not
damage or reflect adversely on the reputation and goodwill associated with the name and mark
'Dow.'" Id. at 1458.
" 7 In re Silicone, 887 E Stipp. at 1459.
145 Id. Lepetit's market included Europe, Central America, South America, Mexico and
Australia. Id. For several years, Lepetit was Dow Corning's largest distributor in Europe and
Australia and its sole distributor in South America. Id.
149 id.
114) See id.
151 See id. at 1462.
In re Silicone, 887 F. Stipp. at 1460.
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with reasonably accurate and complete information.' 54
 The court con-
cluded, thus, that a jury could determine that Dow Chemical affirma-
tively undertook to provide research and testing for Dow Corning,' 55
that Dow Chemical recognized that this research was necessary for the
recipients of Dow Corning medical devices, that physical harm could
result from Dow Chemical's failure to use reasonable care in conduct-
ing or reporting its findings, and that, as a result, the first paragraph
of section 324A was satisfied.' 56
The court then addressed whether the plaintiffs presented evi-
dence that satisfied one of the elements contained in the subsections
of section 324A: increasing the risk of harm, undertaking a duty owed
by another to a third party, or reliance upon the undertaking. 157 The
court reasoned that Dow Corning relied on Dow Chemical's toxicology
testing, silicone testing, research and recommendations and, there-
fore, did not perform other tests on silicone prior to marketing and
distributing breast implants.' 5s Moreover, the court noted that Dow
Corning continued to rely on Dow Chemical's research during the
1970s.' 5" The court concluded that Dow Chemical could be found
liable based on undertaking a duty owed by another to a third party
because Dow Chemical undertook Dow Corning's duty owed to the
154 1d. at 1461.
155
 The court explicitly stated that while it remained unclear whether Dow Chemical ever
received direct compensation from Dow Corning for the services it provided, Dow Chemical, as
a 50% stockholder, certainly had a financial interest in Dow Corning's profits and a reason to
render services to Dow Corning. Id. at 1461-62. Because § 324A covers gratuitous undertakings
as well as those done For consideration, the court never determined whether Dow Chemical
provided its services to Dow Corning for consideration. See id. at 1462. This part of the opinion
was most likely included to prevent confusion in future litigation in jurisdictions that use a
modified § 324A and condition liability upon proof of consideration. See infra notes 272-76 and
accompanying text; Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331,336 n.10 (Mass. 1983) (noting
that Massachusetts only applies § 324A to undertakings done for consideration).
156 1n re. Silicone, 887 F. Supp. at 1461; see RESTATEMENT, .supra note 3, § 324A. In its duty
analysis, the court noted two considerations which were insufficient on their own to establish an
affirmative duty, yet were considered in assessing Dow Chemical's involvement and knowledge
concerning breast implants. See In re Silicone, 887 F. Stipp, at 1461. The first factor was the
distribution of implants by Lepetit, a subsidiary over which Dow Chemical retained 99% control.
Id. Rather than engage in a corporate veil-piercing analysis to determine Dow Chemical's respon-
sibility for Lepetit's implant distribution, the court considered Lepetit as a factor in the duty
analysis. Id. The second additional factor considered in assessing Dow Chemical's involvement
with Dow Corning was the trademark agreement. See id. The court reasoned that the provisions
of a trademark agreement do not create an affirmative undertaking under § 324A. Id. Neverthe-
less, the court noted that the trademark agreement was a factor to be considered in assessing
Dow Chemical's knowledge and involvement in Dow Corning's breast implant activities. Id.
L57 In re Silicone, 887 F. Supp. at 1461; see RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A(a), (b) & (c).
158 1n re Silicone, 887 F. Supp. at 1461.
159 1d.
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plaintiffs to adequately test and research silicones for human implan-
tation. The court also decided that Dow Chemical could be found
liable based on reliance upon the undertaking because Dow Corning,
implant recipients and their physicians relied on Dow Chemical's re-
search and testing of silicones, to the plaintiffs' detriment.'"° The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama thus denied
summary judgment to Dow Chemical because a jury could find that
Dow Chemical undertook to perform research and testing services for
Dow Corning that were necessary for the protection of future recipi-
ents of silicone implants, that Dow Chemical had a duty to use reason-
able care in conducting the silicone tests, and that Dow Corning relied
on the research and testing performed by Dow Chemical.'"'
Soon after Judge Pointer denied Dow Chemical summary judg-
ment, a woman injured by her breast implants, and her husband, went
to trial solely against Dow Chemical.' 62 In this case, Mahlum v. Dow
Corning Corp., in 1995, a Nevada jury found Dow Chemical liable for
negligent performance of an undertaking and awarded fourteen mil-
lion dollars to the plaintiffs.m As in In re Silicone, the plaintiffs presented
evidence regarding Dow Chemical's involvement with Dow Corning,
specifically, the research and testing services Dow Chemical performed
for Dow Corning on the toxicology and safety of silicones.'"' In their
post-trial memorandum, the plaintiffs specifically noted that a jury
could find that when Dow Corning put their breast implants—a new
medical device designed for lifetime implantation in humans—on the
market, Dow Corning was relying on Dow Chemical for the safety of
breast implant materials.'""
I nu Id.; .see RESTATEMENT, .supra note 3, § 324A eras. (1 & e.
161 In re Silicone, 887 E Supp. at 1460-62; see RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A. The court
noted that under the substantive law of some states, the evidence might not create a jury question
in federal court. In re. Silicone, 887 F. Supp. at 1462.
162 Mahlum v. Dow Corning Corp., No. CV93-05941 (Nev. Din. CC. OC.I. 30, 1995). This was
the first breast implant case tried against Dow Chemical as the sole defendant. Mahlum Awarded
$14 Million. in Nevada Suit Against Dow Chemical, MEALEY'S LIT1G. REP.: BREAST IMPLANTS, Oct.
31,1995, at 3. The plaintiffs had named Dow Corning as a defendant in the original complaint,
but the company was severed from the case after it filed for bankruptcy in May 1995. See id.
163 Mahlum, No. CV93-05941. The jury also found die defendant liable for fraudulent
concealment, for providing substantial assistance or encouragement to Dow Corning in its
fraudulent misrepresentation, and for acting in concert with or pursuant to a common design to
engage in a fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. (jury verdict form no. 3).
164 Mahlum, No. CV93-05941 (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
JNOV or New Trial at 27-28); see supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text. In the negligent
undertaking portion of their brief, plaintiffs' counsel relied heavily on language from Judge
Pointer's opinion. Id. (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for JNOV or New
Trial at 26-38).
165 Id. (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for JNOV or New Trial at 28).
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Dow Chemical argued that liability under section 324A can only
arise as to the specific final product and that the plaintiffs, thus, must
specifically prove that Dow Chemical assumed responsibility for breast
implants.'" In response, the plaintiffs explained that the defendant was
attempting to impose a requirement not found in section 324A.' 67 In
support of their argument, the plaintiff's cited judge Pointer's opinion
in which he stated that Dow Chemical's reading of section 324A was
too restrictive and that liability under section 324A arises when it is
reasonably foreseeable that another will be harmed by the failure to
exercise reasonable care in performing an undertaking.' 68
In their argument that Dow Chemical negligently performed an
undertaking, the plaintiffs utilized the condition that provides for
liability when the Good Samaritan undertakes to perform a duty owed
by another to a third person.' 69 The plaintiffs claimed that Dow Corn-
ing owed a duty to properly test and ensure the safety of the liquid
silicone that leaked from its implants into women's bodies, and that
Dow Chemical assumed a portion of this duty.'" The plaintiffs con-
tended that Dow Chemical's assumption of Dow Corning's duty was
evidenced by the 1975 trademark agreement, Dow Chemical's numer-
ous tests of liquid silicones, Dow Chemical's toxicology testing recom-
mendations, and Dow Chemical's knowledge that Dow Corning was
using and relying on their research and advice to develop liquid sili-
cone for medical products.rn
The plaintiffs also relied upon a recent Nevada Supreme Court
decision, Wright v. Schum, where the plaintiffs brought a section 324A
claimin In Wright, the court held that a landlord could have been
found to have partially undertaken a tenant's duty to protect the public
from the tenant's pit bull)" The court based its finding of liability on
the landlord's "power to control" the acts of the tenant in protecting
The plaintiffs cited to documentary evidence and witness testimony which showed Dow Corning's
reliance on its parent, Dow Chemical. Id. (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for JNOV or New Trial at 28). •
16° Id. (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for JNOV or New Trial at 28-29).
167 Id. (Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for JNOV or New Trial at 28).
16g Id. (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for JNOV or New Trial at 27-28)
(citing In re Silicone, 887 F. Supp. at 1460).
1611 Mahlunt, No. 0.'93-0594 l (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
JNOV or New Trial at 30-31); see RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A(b).
171 ' Mahlunt, No. CV93-05941 (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
JNOV or New Trial at 31).
171 Id. (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion lOr JNOV or New Trial at 31-32).
172 1d. (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for JNOV or New Trial at 32);
see Wright v. Satin], 781 P.2d 1142,1144 (Nev. 1987).
173 Wright, 781 P.2d at 1146.
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the public. 174 The plaintiffs argued that Dow Chemical, like the land-
lord in Wright, through its status as fifty percent stockholder of Dow
Corning and its extensive involvement with Dow Corning in other
areas clearly had the power to control the acts of Dow Corning. 175 The
research and testing by Dow Chemical, argued the plaintiffs, amounted
to more than passive observation and constituted influence and con-
trol over Dow Corning's conduct.' 7"
The plaintiffs also argued that Dow Chemical could be found
liable because Dow Chemical's negligent performance of an undertak-
ing increased the plaintiffs' risk of harm or, in the alternative, because
the plaintiffs' harm was suffered due to the plaintiffs' and Dow Corn-
ing's reliance upon Dow Chemical's undertaking. 177 The plaintiffs con-
tended that Dow Chemical's negligence increased the breast implant
recipients' risk of harm because Dow Chemical failed to conduct or
recommend long term safety testing.' 78 The plaintiffs predicated liabil-
ity under section 324A(c), reliance upon the undertaking, on Dow
Corning's reliance on Dow Chemical for silicone toxicity testing and
safety advice.' 79 The plaintiffs supported their reliance claim with evi-
dence that when Dow Corning began marketing implants in 1962, it
had clone no silicone toxicity testing itself and thus Dow Corning was
completely relying on the toxicity testing conducted by Dow Chemi-
cal.'s(' The jury's verdict accepting the plaintiffs' negligent undertaking
theory of liability, followed by a state judge's denial of Dow Chemical's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, con-
stituted a landmark decision in the history of section 324A.' 8 '
174 ht
1713 Mahlunt, No. CV93-05941 (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
JNOV or New Trial at 32); see Wright, 781 P.2d at 1146.
1711
 Alt/iliUM, No. CV93-05941 (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
JNOV or New Trial at 32-33). Control is not an element of § 324A, nevertheless, the Nevada
Supreme Court incorporated it into its § 324A analysis in Wright. See. Wright, 781 P.2d at 1146;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A. Control is actually an important element of piercing the
corporate veil. See II. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPOMTIONS § I38, at 318-21 (1946).
177 Mahlum, No. CV93-05941 (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
JNOV or New Trial at 36).
1711 Id. (Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for JNOV or New Trial at 37).
175 1d. (Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for JNOV or New Trial at 37),
188 Id. (Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for JNOV or New Trial at 37).
181 See M. (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition 10 Defendant's Motion for JNOV or New Trial at
38); Dow Chemical Denied JNOV, New Trial in Nevado Breast Implant Case, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP,:
BREAST IMPLANTS, Feb. 15, 1996, at 11. In addition to succeeding on her § 324A claim, the
Plaintiff also succeeded on her claims of fraudulent concealment, substantial assistance or en-
couragement, and acting in concert with or pursuant to a common design. Mahlum, No. CV93—
05941 (Jury Verdict Form No. 3, at 1).
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III. NEGLIGENT UNDERTAKING—THE GOOD, THE BAD & THE UGLY
A. The Good
The widespread use of the negligent undertaking cause of action
by employees of subsidiary corporations led to the birth of a new
generation of section 324A plaintiffs: consumers. Armed with this
weapon, consumer-plaintiffs could hold parent corporations account-
able for their negligence just as their predecessors, subsidiary employ-
ees, had done.' 82
 The evolution of the negligent undertaking cause of
action into the products liability arena is not only a logical step, but a
positive one.
The plaintiffs in In re Silicone stated a claim for relief by satisfying
the requirements set forth in section 324A. 183
 Although this satisfied
the prima facie requirements, the ultimate success of the plaintiffs'
claim remains to be seen. By analogizing the products liability cases to
the employer-employee cases, the success of breast implant plaintiffs
such as Charlotte Mahlum using the negligent undertaking cause of
action is not surprising.
The subtleties that helped give subsidiary employees a cause of
action under section 324A are also present in the products liability
arena. Just as employers owe a duty to their employees, corporations
owe a duty to the purchasers of their products. When a parent corpo-
ration decides to assist its subsidiary in carrying out its duty, employees
and consumers are often victims of the parent corporation's failure to
use reasonable care in providing advice and services. Just as employees
rely on their employer to ensure their own personal safety, consumers
expect a manufacturer to ensure the safety of a product that they place
on the market. 184
 Additionally, the subsidiary-manufacturer relies on
the expertise of its parent corporation regarding employee safety issues
as well as product safety. 183
 Thus, there is a chain of reliance—the
consumer relies on the subsidiary, the subsidiary relies on the parent. 186
In each link, the reliance on the other party is fairly placed. 187
 This
182 See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1455, 1460 (N.D.
Ala. 1995); Mahlum v. Dow Corning Corp., No. CV95-05941 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Oct. 30, 1995).
183 /n re Silicone, 887 F. Supp. at 1463.
184 This is especially true when the product is designed for human implantation, as in the
breast implant litigation. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
185
 See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
I 86 The subsidiary's reliance on the parent is sufficient to impose liability under § 324A. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A(c). The language in § 324A(c) reads that the Good Samari-
tan is subject to liability if the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third
person upon the undertaking." Id.
187 See REsTATEmENT„suizra note 3, § 324A(c). The Restatement recognizes this chain of
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chain connects the plaintiff to the parent corporation; section 324A
merely transforms this connection into a legal cause of action: 88 Con-
sumer-plaintiffs, similarly situated to the earlier employee-plaintiffs, are
thus imparted with the power to retaliate when colossal corporate
parents are responsible for their harm.
Furthermore, litigants' utilization of the Good Samaritan Doctrine
to recover from parent corporations for negligently assisting their
subsidiaries satisfies the goals of the tort system: compensation and
deterrence:89 When a corporation branches into a risky or experimen-
tal area, it often establishes this division as a separately incorporated
subsidiary so that if the experimental endeavor is unsuccessful, any
losses will be wholly contained within the subsidiary.' 9° Thus, the estab-
lishment of subsidiaries protects parent corporations and their share-
holders from financial liability associated with failed business ventures
if the venture is required to declare bankruptcy.
Consumers of the failed venture's products, however, are often left
unprotected. Consumers are sometimes harmed as a result of a corpo-
ration's unsuccessful endeavor and are left without an avenue of re-
course against the insolvent subsidiary.' 9 ' Prior to In re Silicone, subsidi-
aries' increasingly popular practice of filing for bankruptcy protection
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code left consumers uncompen-
sated for the harm they suffered.' 92 Now, using section 324A, parent
corporations' "deep pockets" are available to the injured victims of
corporate experiments who seek compensation for the harm they
suffered.
The breast implant litigation illustrates this series of events. Dow
Corning's filing for bankruptcy protection left women with Dow Corn-
ing implants unable to recover for their injuries.'" Fortunately for
reliance by providing for liability under § 324A(c) where the direct recipient of the Good
Samaritan's services nr a third party relied upon the undertaking. See id.
188
 See id.
189 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER El'. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS § .1, at 1 (9th ed. 1994).
190 NORMAN D. LATTlN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 13, at 91 (1959). Lattin notes that it
is doubtful whether the statutory authority allowing corporations to establish subsidiaries was
intended to authorize corporations to re-insulate themselves and their shareholders against
unlimited liability by forming wholly owned corporations to serve as shock absorbers in some
risky part of the business. Id.; .see RALLANTINE, .vu/ a note 176, § 135, at 309; Natale, supra note
23, at 736 & n.123.
191 See,	 Mahlum, No. CV93-05941.
192 See, e.g., In re Silicone, 887 E Supp. at 1462. Dow Corning filed for bankruptcy on May 15,
1995 due, in part, to the tide of litigation from breast implant recipients seeking compensation
for their injuries. Id.
193 See In re Dow Corning Corp., No. 95-20512, 1995 WL 495978, at *1 (Banks. E,D. Mich.
Aug. 9, 1995), There is also a record of Dow's bankruptcy tiling. See The Bankruptcy Data
Source—DataPage, 1995 WL 318460 (N.G.R.).
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these victims, the Good Samaritan Doctrine provided the basis for
Judge Pointer's ruling that plaintiffs with Dow Corning implants could
recover from Dow Chemical, Dow Corning's parent.'"
Ideally, imposing liability on parent corporations through section
324A will also satisfy the additional tort system objectives of deterring
wrongful conduct. and encouraging socially responsible behavior. 195
The looming threat of liability will most likely encourage parent cor-
porations to exercise greater care when extending their services to
subsidiary corporations. 19" Although corporations are persons in the
eyes of the law, they lack human emotions such as integrity, empathy
and sensitivity. 197
 These emotions inspire individuals to act as Good
Samaritans and use reasonable care when providing assistance.' 98 Cor-
porations, however, are motivated almost entirely by profit. 199 The threat
of litigation and the accompanying fear of profit loss provide the neces-
sary impetus for corporations to act as socially responsible citizens.
The benefit of limited liability enjoyed by parent corporations
should only protect them to a certain extent:2w Parent corporations
cannot expect to receive the benefits of the corporate veil without
subjecting themselves to liability in tort for their own negligent con-
duct.201
 Moreover, if parent corporations choose to incorporate their
high-risk divisions as subsidiaries in order to insulate themselves from
the subsidiaries' losses, then parents must treat these subsidiaries as
separate legal entities rather than as divisions of the parent corpora-
tions.202 If
, however, parent corporations provide their subsidiaries with
19.1 In re Silicone, 887 F. Stipp. at 1462.
195 PROSSER, supra note 189, § I , at 1.
19 ' Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability ofCorpo-
rate Participants for 'Arts of the Enterprise. 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19 (1994).
197 See 1 Wir.t.inm M. FixcHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA 01 THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIC)NS § 7.05, at 447 (rev, perm. ed. 1990) (noting that corporations are not always or in all senses
"persons"); Martin Benjamin & Daniel A. Bronstein, Moral and Criminal Responsibility and
Corporate Persons, in CORPORATIONS AND Socume 277, 279 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller
eds., 1987).
1011 See Benjamin & Bronstein, supra note 197, at 277. The authors further note that individu-
als, unlike corporations, are concerned with certain principles even when they do not further a
basic g0911, such as overall happiness.
1911
	 id. at 277-78 (noting that corporate tlecisitm-making is constrained by corporation's
goals, which include maximization of profits).
2' See HARRY G. HENN SCJOIIN R. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATCONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERF'HISES !e) 146, at 344 (3d ed. 1986).
201 lieinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber (:o., 532 F. Stipp. 1348, 1356 (D. Md. 1982).
202 See BALLANT1NE, AUPEa note 176, § 135, at 309. In addition to the reason fur establishing
subsidiaries that is discussed here, Ballantine lists the following additional reasons for parents to
establish subsidiary corporations: I) to obtain tax benefits; 2) to avoid service of process on the
parent corporation and escape litigation in other states by having a selling subsidiary carry on
business there for the benefit or its parent, but not as its agent; 3) to retain benefit of corporate
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services designed to increase the subsidiaries' profitability, parents
should accept the duty to act with reasonable care, Parent corporations
want to have it both ways—insulate themselves from any harm caused
by a risky subsidiary while profiting from the subsidiary's success. By
providing the subsidiary with aid and assistance, the parent corpora-
tion ensures that the subsidiary's venture will be successful and profitable
for its shareholders. Section 324A holds a parent corporation account-
able to the victims of its subsidiary's risky venture when the parent's
negligent aid and assistance leads to the victims' harm."
Therefore, a parent corporation that undertakes to render serv-
ices to a subsidiary should be regarded as any other information-sup-
plying entity and be subject to liability under section 324A. 204 The only
relevance of the parent corporation's relationship with the subsidiary
would be to determine, as is required in some jurisdictions, whether
the services were performed gratuitously or for consideration, 2"5 As the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland aptly stated in
.Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., "Parent corporations are not
entitled, on public policy or other grounds, to an exemption from tort
liability when their conduct results in harm to persons as to whom the
law recognizes the existence of a duty of care." 2 °
For plaintiffs seeking to impose liability on a parent corporation,
the Good Samaritan Doctrine is a more attractive alternative to pierc-
ing the corporate vei1. 207 Nevertheless, piercing the corporate veil is
available to plaintiffs seeking to get at a corporation's shareholders,
such as a parent corporation. A subsidiary will probably not be recog-
nized as a separate corporation if any of the following factors are
present: (1) intermingling of parent and subsidiary's business transac-
tions, accounts, and records; (2) failure to observe formalities of sepa-
rate corporate procedures for each corporation; (3) failure to ade-
quately finance each corporation as a separate unit; or (4) failure to
hold out the respective corporations to the public as separate enter-
prises. 2"
n ame and good will; and 4) to combine various operating companies into tine large company.
Id. at 309-10.
2" Piercing the subsidiary corporation's veil of limited liability is another option available to
victims of corporate negligence. See infra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
161 Heinrich, 532 F. Supp. at 1356.
"5 For a discussion of Massachusetts's interpretation of § 324A, which requires proof of
consideration, see infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text; .supra notes 272-82 and accompa-
nying text.
296 Heinrich, 532 F. Supp. at 1356.
207 See Natale, supra note 23, at 734-35.
"See. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 200, § 148, at 355-56.
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It is often difficult to pierce a corporation's veil of limited liability,
and thus, section 324A is a much more attractive option.l 0° Courts are
hesitant to disregard the corporate form and expose its shareholders
to liability.")
 As one court stated, "disregard of a legally established
corporate entity is an extraordinary remedy which exists as a last
resort." 21
 Therefore, plaintiffs seeking to impose liability on a parent
corporation will probably achieve greater success using the Good Sa-
maritan Doctrine than attempting to pierce the corporate veil. 212
The Good Samaritan Doctrine and corporate veil piercing are
similar in that both disregard limited liability in the interests of justice,
equity and fairness. 213
 The most striking similarity between these two
methods of imposing liability lies with the element of contro1. 2 " Al-
though section 324A does not require a showing of control, this ele-
ment has made its way into many Good Samaritan cases. 215 As part of
their section 324A claim, the plaintiffs in Mahlum argued that Dow
Chemical's undertaking amounted to more than mere passive obser-
vation and that, for this reason, Dow Chemical had the power to
control Dow Corning's conduct.!"' Control is relevant in a section 324A
claim to show that the defendant affirmatively undertook actions of
sufficient importance so as to influence the subsidiary's actions. 217 By
rendering aid and assistance to another, the Good Samaritan is to some
extent controlling the acts of the individual or organization to whom
it is rendering its services.218
Nevertheless, the significance of control in the Good Samaritan
Doctrine is different than in corporate veil piercing. In the former,
control provides evidence of the Good Samaritan's knowledge of, and
209
 See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
210 See Gayle L. Troutwine & Leslie A. Kocher, Corporate. Veil Piercing as it Applies to Breast
Implant Litigation, MED.-LEGAL ASPECTS OF BREAST IMPLANTS, Apr. 1995, at 4; Natale, supra note
23, at 734.
211 Ainfac Foods, Inc, v. International Sys. & Controls Corp., 654 P.2d 1092,1098 (Or. 1982).
212 See Natale, supra note 23, at 734.
21;1
	 HENN RC ALEXANDER, supra note 200, § 146, at 314.
211 But see 10 FLETCHER, supra note 197, § 4878, at 351. Fletcher notes that under the Good
Samaritan Doctrine, a parent corporation's liability is based on its own positive undertaking, not
on allegations of control over the subsidiary. Id. Although this is true based on the explicit
language of § 324A, further analysis reveals that control is not completely absent. See infra notes
215-21 and accompanying text.
215 See, e.g., Mahlum No. CV93-05941 (Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
fOr JNOV or New Trial at 32-33).
216 Id. (Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for JNOV or New Trial at 32-33).
217 See In re Silicone, 887 F. Supp. at 1461; Mahlum, No. CV93-05941 (Plaintiff's Brief in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for JNOV or New Trial at 32-33).
218
 See Mahlum, No. CV93-05941 (Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
JNOV or New Trial at 32-33).
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involvement in, the subsidiary's activities in order to establish a positive
undertaking by the parent corporation."' In the latter, control shows
that the subsidiary corporation did not exist as a separate legal entity
and served as a mere instrumentality of its shareholder parent. 22° A
subsidiary's failure to follow corporate formalities renders it undeserv-
ing of the benefit of limited liability for its shareholders and thus
warrants piercing the subsidiary's corporate vei1. 2"
Despite the common element of control, these two paths to share-
holder liability are quite different. Whereas section 324A focuses on a
parent corporation's independent duty owed to the plaintiffs, veil
piercing focuses on the relationship between the parent corporation
and the subsidiary, particularly, whether the two corporations were
maintained as separate legal enterprises.'" Unlike veil piercing, section
324A is not based on a parent's control over its subsidiary but rather
on a parent's affirmative rendering of services to its subsidiary.'"
B. The Bad
While there are many arguments in favor of using the Good
Samaritan Doctrine to impose liability on parent corporations, there
are some persuasive arguments against its use in this context.224 First,
the use of section 324A to hold parent corporations liable might
discourage parent corporations from intervening in their subsidiaries'
operations. 225 Public policy encourages a parent corporation to share
information with its subsidiary, not only to increase the profits of both
entities but also to ensure that the subsidiary creates safe products:22"
A parent company often possesses superior knowledge regarding safety
and operating procedures associated with the subsidiary's business. 227
2" In re Silicone, 887 F. Stipp. at 1461.
220 See 10 FLETCHER, supra note 197, § 4878, at 350.
221 See id.
222
 See generally id. at 351.
220 See id; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra (tole 200, § 146, at 345. Veil piercing is based on the
parent corporation's disregard of the principle that a corporation is a separate legal entity, distinct
from its shareholders. See 10 RETcHER, supra note 197, § 4878, at 351; HENN Sc ALEXANDER,
supra note 200, § 146, at 345. Just as this concept gives corporations limited liability, it can also
be taken away to expose the shareholders to suit. See 10 FLETCHER, supra note 197, § 4878, at
351; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 200, § 146, at 345.
224 This discussion will focus on the arguments against using § 324A to impose liability on
parent corporations in products liability actions. For arguments against using § 324A to bring an
action against a parent corporation for failing to provide a sale workplace, see Naiale, supra note
23, at 735-36.
225 Natale, supra note 23, at 736.
226 Heinrich, 532 F. Supp. at 1356.
227 Natule, supra note 23, at 736.
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For example, a parent corporation would hopefully advise its naive
subsidiary that sacrificing product safety in order to cut costs is not
worth the risk of consumer injury. 228 Nevertheless, a parent corpora-
tion's assistance only helps a subsidiary if it. is properly given. Thus,
parent corporations' failure to use due care when dispensing informa-
don and services could eventually harm, rather than help, their sub-
sidiaries. 229
The breast implant litigation provides another excellent example
of this point. Dow Corning relied upon Dow Chemical's research and
testing services; however, they might have received more honest advice
from an independent, unbiased research facility that did not have
anything to lose by advising Dow Corning that breast implants were
potentially dangerous. 2" Dow Chemical's desire to increase profits
likely colored their test results and advice. In a situation such as this,
the availability of section 324A might diminish the parent corpora-
tion's inherent bias and encourage the parent to use due care when
providing its subsidiary with services."'
Critics of section 324A also argue that use of the Good Samaritan
Doctrine in the parent-subsidiary corporate context discourages cor-
porations from establishing subsidiaries in high-risk areas. 232
 As a result,
technological development could suffer in industries where parents
rely on their subsidiaries to insulate them from the dangers associated
with developing a technologically advanced product. 2  This result,
however, is highly unlikely. Innovative ideas and products result in
corporate profits and success, and often these new ideas can only be
realized by taking risks. Corporations exist to bring in dividends for
the shareholders; thus, if achieving this purpose requires product de-
velopment on the cutting edge of technology, then this practice will
continue regardless of the potential liability."s 9 Section 324A does not
prevent parent corporations from developing subsidiaries in high-risk
areas or from aiding those subsidiaries once they are established. It
225
 See I Corp. L. Guide (CCH)11 413, at 855 (1987) (noting that it is not improper for more
experienced parent corporation to provide its subsidiary with helpful information); Note, Strict
Products Liability: Admissibility of Post
-Manufacture Safety Standards on the Issue of Design Defect,
2 Rev. 1..rrm. 331,336—'37 (1982).
229 Although Dow Chemical's aid and assistance to Dow Corning might have helped the
subsidiary initially, it eventually forced them into bankruptcy. See infra notes 230-3I and accom-
panying 'ext.
23" See In re Silicone, 887 F. Stipp. at 1458,
231 See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
232
 See Natale, supra note 23, at 736.
233 See id.
234 See Benjamin & Bronstein, supra note 197, at 278.
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simply requires that if a parent corporation decides to assist its subsidi-
ary corporation, it must use due care."5 It requires parent corporations
to internalize the costs of entering into risky ventures rather than
allowing a parent's shareholders to externalize the risks of its venture
on some other unsuspecting individuals, such as consumers.
Another criticism of the Good Samaritan Doctrine is that it un-
dercuts the corporate privilege of limited liability, one of the major
advantages of incorporating."' Limited liability is one of the principle
tenets of corporate law, allowing for increased investment in necessary
but risky ventures. Exempting shareholders from individual liability for
a corporation's debts or torts attracts investors and assembles large
amounts of capital. 237 Shareholders are more likely to invest in a new
or risky corporation knowing that they will not lose more than the
amount of their investment."' Because investors' potential losses are
limited to the amount of their investment, they spend less money to
protect their investments and their positions."' Corporate investment
would certainly suffer without the protection of limited liability for
shareholders."' Section 324A, however, does not impose liability on a
parent for just any harm caused by its subsidiary."' Section 324A imposes
liability only for those harms that flow from the parent's negligent
rendering of aid or assistance. 242 Thus, imposing liability seems only
fair given that the parent corporation's shareholders are the ones who
will benefit if the subsidiary's venture is successful.
Another potentially unjust result of utilizing the Good Samaritan
Doctrine is that it has the same effect as piercing the subsidiary's
corporate veil without consideration of the factors normally required
to achieve this remedy of last resort. 24  Thus, even if the subsidiary was
not ibrmed or used for an improper, fraudulent or unjust purpose, the
subsidiary corporation may be disregarded and the parent shareholder
may he subject to liability under section 324A. 241 Nevertheless, a parent
235 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A.
236 See 1 Ft.rtcitEu, supra note 197, § 14, at 464 (noting that main reason for popularity of
corporations is limited liability of stockholders).
237 BALLANTINE, supra note 176, at 4.
"8 See id.
239 Frank FL Easierbrook & Daniel R. Fische!, Limited Liability and the Cmporation, 52 U. Ci it.
1.. RKv. 89, 95 (1985). Many of the arguments in favor of limited liability Inc sharcholdeN are
more applicable to individual shareholders than in corporate shareholders. See id. al. 94-97.
24 n See BALLANT1NE, supra note 176.
241 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A.
242 See id.
213 See H ENN & ALEXANDER, SUM note 200.
2+1 See 1 FL•'rcHER, supra no to 197, § 41, at 602-03.
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corporation's liability under section 324A is unrelated to its status as
shareholder in the subsidiary corporation. 245 Under the Good Samari-
tan Doctrine, a parent is viewed as any other entity who undertakes to
provide the subsidiary with services. 246 A parent should not be permit-
ted to use its status as shareholder to exempt itself from the standard
of due care that every other Good Samaritan must adhere to. 247 The
Good Samaritan Doctrine does not mandate that parent corporations
refrain from assisting their subsidiary corporations. It simply requires
that if parent corporations choose to provide their subsidiaries with
services, then they must use reasonable care when doing so.
C. The Ugly
A particularly unpleasant result of the Good Samaritan Doctrine's
application in the products liability arena is the disparity in verdicts
due to states' modifications of section 324A.248 Nevertheless, the modified
versions of section 324A have remedied some of the policy concerns
present in the Restatement's version. New York supplements section
324A with the additional requirement of a misrepresentation or non-
disclosure on the part of the defendant that misleads the plaintiff to
his or her detriment. 249 Reliance by the plaintiff is traditionally one of
three possible ways to impose liability on a Good Samaritan under
section 324A, yet in New York, reliance is a prerequisite to a successful
claim.25"
By requiring the element of reliance, New York focuses on the
relationship between the plaintiff and the Good Samaritan. In fact, the
court requires a "direct relationship" between the plaintiff and defen-
dant, noting in Eisman that the relationship between the parties must
be such that the plaintiff has the right to rely upon the Good Samaritan
for information and the Good Samaritan owes a duty to give it with
care.251 Focusing on the relationship between the parties prevents vir-
tually limitless liability to a universe of plaintiffs, eliminating many
claims in situations in which the Good Samaritan did not owe a duty. 252
245 See 10 Furi .cumt, supra note 197, § 4878, at 351.
24 '1 See Heinrich, 532 F. Stipp. at 1356.
217 See Id.
21 See supra notes 54-92 and accompanying text; In re Silicone Breast Implant Litigation,
N.Y. LI, Sept. 27, 1995, at 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1st Dept.) (denying New York breast implant plaintiffs
right to bring action against Dow Chemical) [hereinafter In re Silicone New York].
515 Eistnan v. New York, 511 N.E.2d 1128, 1135 (N.Y. 1987).
250 See id.; In re Silicone New York, supra note 248, at 25.
251 Eisman, 511 N.E.2d at 1135; In re Silicone New York, supra note 248, at 25.
252 See Eisman, 511 N.E.2d at 1135.
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Furthermore, imposing liability only if the Good Samaritan makes an
affirmative misrepresentation or nondisclosure limits Good Samari-
tans' liability and thus furthers the policy of encouraging Good Samari-
tans to act.255
Yet there are negative consequences that flow from New York's
modification of the elements required for a valid negligent undertak-
ing claim. By mandating that reliance be present in the negligent
undertaking claims, New York unfairly disadvantages the New York
breast implant plaintiffs as compared to breast implant plaintiffs in
other states. 254 New York's additional requirement caused the court in
In re New York Slate Silicone to ignore what would have been a valid
section 324A claim in virtually every other jurisdiction. 255 The court
found only a tenuous connection between Dow Chemical and the
breast implant plaintiffs and that Dow Chemical never undertook to
provide the plaintiff's with any services. 25& A court in a traditional section
324A jurisdiction would recognize that although Dow Chemical may
not have provided services to the breast implant plaintiffs, Dow Chemi-
cal undertook Dow Corning's duty owed to breast implant recipients
by conducting research and testing on silicone for thern. 257 Dow Chemi-
cal's undertaking of Dow Corning's duty is thus sufficient to impose
liability under section 324A(b), which imposes liability on a Good
Samaritan for undertaking a duty owed by another to a third person.258
The New York trial court's unique analysis of the breast implant
plaintiffs' negligent undertaking claim also caused them to ignore
section 324A(a), which imposes liability when the Good Samaritan's
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the plaintiffs risk of harm. 259
Because the court found that the plaintiffs did not rely on Dow Chemi-
cal's information in making their decision to receive breast implants,
the plaintiffs' claim could not succeed. 26° In a traditional section 324A
jurisdiction, the breast implant plaintiffs' claim would succeed despite
the lack of reliance if the court found that Dow Chemical's negligent
testing and recommendations increased the risk of harm to the breast
implant recipients. 2" 1
253 See id
254 See In re Silicone New York, .supra note 248, at 25.
255 See id. For a listing of states that follow § 324A, see supra note 6.
256 See In re Silicone New York, supra note 248, at 25.
257 See In re Silicone, 887 F. Supp. at 1461-62.
253 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3 , § 324A(b).
259 Id. § 324A(a).
266 In re Silicone New York, supra note 248, at 25.
261 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A(a).
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Finally, the court's focus on the relationship between the breast
implant plaintiffs and Dow Chemical clouded its opinion and imposed
a requirement that is not expressly or implicitly contained in section
324A. 262 Section 324A addresses a Good Samaritan's liability to a third
person, rather than liability to the person the Good Samaritan helps
direcdy.26a Furthermore, the language of section 324A expressly focuses
on the actions of the Good Samaritan, rather than on the relationship
between the Good Samaritan and the third person. 264 By focusing on
the plaintiff's relationship with the defendant, the court essentially
misplaced the plaintiff's negligent undertaking cause of action under
the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 323, used when a direct
beneficiary of the Good Samaritan's services seeks to impose liability. 265
This New York court misunderstood and incorrectly analyzed the plain-
tiffs' valid negligent undertaking claim, due in part to the confusion
resulting from New York's modifications of section 324A.
Minnesota's modification of 324A is similar to New York's modifica-
tion in its language but less severe in its application.2'6
 Minnesota
defines reliance in much the same way as New York, requiring that
reliance be based on specific actions or representations that cause the
plaintiffs to forego other alternatives of protecting themselves. 267 Un-
like New York, however, Minnesota does not require reliance as a
prerequisite to imposing liability under section 324A.25s Minnesota
places the reliance element in the same position as the Restatement—
as one of a variety of conditions which may be used to impose liability
for negligent perlbrmance of an undertaking.'°° Although this aspect
of Minnesota's modification will not cause a problem for plaintiffs, the
conspicuous absence of section 324A(b), undertaking to perform a
duty owed by another to a third person, from Minnesota's modified
2 ''2 See id. § 324A.
2" See id. § 324A cud. a (explaining that § 323 addresses the liability of the actor to the one
to whom he has undertaken to render services).
.464 See id. § 324A. This section provides liability for "one who undertakes to render services
for another which the [Good Samaritan] should recognize as necessary for the protection of a
third person or his things .. . ." Id. Section 324A also focuses on the Good Samaritan's under-
taking and the Good Samaritan's failure to exercise reasonable care. See id. The only plaintiff
based wording in § 324A is in subsection (c), which focuses on the plaintiff's reliance. See id.
265 See id. § 323, § 324A cmt. a.
'266 See Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801,806-07,807 n.9, n.11 (Minn. 1979);
supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
267 Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 807.
268 Compare id. at 800-07 (noting that reasonable reliance tends to impose duty of care) with
Eisman, 511 N.E.2d at 1135 (noting that duty of care is only imposed when there is misrepresen-
tation or nondisclosure by defendant which misleads plaintiff to his/her detriment).
269 See Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 806-07; RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A.
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version will prevent some plaintiffs in that state from bringing a suc-
cessful claim against a parent corporation:27° The absence of this ave-
nue of liability will be felt most by plaintiffs in the corporate arena
because a parent corporation's actions often supplant a duty owed by
its subsidiary corporation to the consumer. 27 '
Massachusetts's modification of section 324A requires a plaintiff
to prove gross negligence where a Good Samaritan provided its services
gratuitously.272 Accordingly, the plaintiffs must prove that the Good
Samaritan performed its services for consideration in order to avoid
application of the heightened negligence standard. 27' Requiring gross
negligence for gratuitous undertakings encourages true Good Samari-
tans —those who provide aid without any selfish motive—to act without
fear of liability while requiring that they do not act recklessly. Applied
in the corporate arena, an older, more experienced parent corporation
may offer its expertise to a subsidiary corporation without much fear
of liability. Nevertheless, in this situation the parent corporation is
disguised as a Good Samaritan but is actually providing its services with
the hope of resulting profits.
The law provides little guidance as to what constitutes considera-
tion in this context, for example, whether the Good Samaritan must
be directly compensated For the services it provides or whether a profit
motive alone is sufficient. In In re Silicone, the Northern District of
Alabama implicitly suggested that a profit incentive is sufficient evi-
dence of consideration. 274 Specifically, the court stated that it was un-
clear whether Dow Chemical ever received direct compensation from
Dow Corning for its testing and recommendations; however, Dow Chemi-
cal certainly had an interest in Dow Corning's profits and a reason to
render services to Dow Corning due to Dow Chemical's position as a
fifty percent stockholder. 275 The court did not reach a definitive con-
clusion on this issue because section 324A does not condition liability
upon proof of consideration:27°A determination as to whether a share-
270 See Graeraft, 279 N.W.2d at 806-07; RESTATEMENT, .supra note 3, § 324A(b).
271 See, e.g., In re Silicone, 887 F, Supp. at 1461 (court concluded that jury could reasonably
find that Dow Chemical undertook Dow Corning's duty to test and research silicone adequately);
Mahlum, No. CV93-05941 (Plaintiff's Brief' in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for JNOV or
New Trial at 31) (plaintiffs argued that Dow Chemical assumed portion of Dow Corning's duty
to properly test and ensure the safety or liquid silicone in breast implants).
272 Pierre v, United States, 741 F. Stipp. 306, 309 (D. Mass. 1990); Mullins v. Pine Manor
College, 449 N.E.2d 331, 336 11.10 (Mass. 1983); see supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
273 See Pierre, 741 F. Supp. at 309; Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 336 n.10.
274 See In re Silicone, 557 F. Supp. at 1461-62.
275 Id.
276
 Id. at 1462.
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holder's profit incentive constitutes proof of consideration would have
greatly assisted Massachusetts plaintiffs in attempting to hold a parent
corporation liable for negligent performance of an undertaking.
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
complicated this issue further in Pierre v. United States, interpreting the
Mullins decision as requiring the plaintiff to show that the undertaking
was an "indispensable part of a bundle of services" for which consid-
eration had been given. 2" The Pierre court's interpretation of Mullins
is erroneous. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts never ex-
pressed an intention to require an undertaking to be an indispensable
part of a bundle of services in order for the actor to be subject to
liability under section 324A. 278 In Mullins, this language surfaced amidst
the court's observation that colleges generally provide their students
with protection from criminal acts of third parties and that students
are charged for this service. 279
 The court thus stated that adequate
security is an indispensable part of a bundle of services that colleges
afford their students. 2" This statement is merely dicta. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts presumably did not intend to establish
an additional element required for a voluntary undertaking. 28 ' Pierre
has little weight in Massachusetts state courts because it is a federal
district court decision; nevertheless, litigants should still consider it
when preparing to bring a section 324A claim in Massachusetts.282
IV. THE FUTURE OF SECTION 324A
Breast implant litigants' love affair with the Good Samaritan Doc-
trine has not ended. Thirteen thousand breast implant victims have
filed suit against Dow Chemical, many of them claiming negligent
performance of an undertaking among their causes of action. 2" After
Dow Corning took refuge behind the bankruptcy code, the 1.3 million
recipients of Dow Corning implants were denied a source of compen-
sation for their harm. 284 Now, many frustrated breast implant recipients
277 Pierre, 741 F. Supp. at 309. The court also noted that the undertaking in question need
not have been specifically contracted for. See id.
278 See Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 336 & n.10. For a discussion of Mullins, see supra notes 57-65
and accompanying text.
279 See id. at 336.
280 1d.
281 The additional element referred to here is the requirement that the undertaking he an
indispensable part of a bundle of services. See id. Consideration, on the other hand, is clearly
required for a § 324A claim in Massachusetts. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. For a
definition of "voluntary undertaking," see supra note 62.
282 See Pierre, 741 F. Supp. at 309.
283joanne Wojcik, Coverage, Bus. 1Ns., Feb. 19, 1996, at 1.
284 1d.
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are finally obtaining justice and relief with the aid of the Good Samari-
tan Doctrine.
Section 324A is also seeing action in another toxic tort/products
liability arena: tobacco litigation. 285 Though the Good Samaritan Doc-
trine is not being used in this context to impose liability on a parent
for rendering services to its subsidiary, plaintiffs are nevertheless using
this tort to obtain compensation from large corporate defendants. 289
Minnesota and Massachusetts are among the states that have brought
actions against tobacco companies to recover for Medicaid payments
that the states paid on behalf of their citizens who were suffering from
smoking-related illnesses. 287
 Many of these states have already settled
with one of the defendants, cigarette maker Liggett Group. 288
The Good Samaritan Doctrine will likely achieve different results
in different states. In Minnesota, the State survived the defendants'
motion to dismiss the Good Samaritan count of its complaint. 289 In
Massachusetts, the success of the Good Samaritan Doctrine in tobacco
litigation remains to be seen. 29° Nevertheless, the Commonwealth's
complaint provides insight into section 324A's applicability in the to-
bacco litigation arena. 29 I The Commonwealth first alleged that the
tobacco companies undertook a duty to Massachusetts citizens, and the
Department of Medical Assistance, to aid the research effort into all
aspects of tobacco use and human health and to disclose complete and
accurate information about the effects of cigarette smoking on human
health. 292 Next, the Commonwealth claimed that the defendants un-
dertook to render services and recognized that such services were neces-
sary for the protection of the health of millions of Massachusetts citi-
255 Commonwealth v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 95-7378 (Mass. Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 19, 1995)
(complaint); State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 19, 1995).
286 Commonwealth v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 95-7378 (complaint); State v. Philip Morris,
Inc., No. C1-94-8565.
287 Commonwealth v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 95-7378 (complaint); State v. Philip Morris,
Inc., No. CI-94-8565. In addition to Minnesota and Massachusetts, the states of Arizona, Con-
necticut, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Newiersey, Okla-
homa, Texas, Utah, Washington and West Virginia have all brought similar claims against the
tobacco industry. State Medicaid Tobacco Suits Update, West's Legal News 121 .74,1996 WL 656978,
Nov. 14,1996.
288 Maria Shao, Mass. Moves to Ink Pact, BOSTON Gtoisii, March IS, 1996, at 33,37.
289 State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565.
291 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts's lawsuit against the tobacco companies is at the
early stages of litigation. On May 20,1996, a federal judge remanded the case to state court. See
Judy Rakowsky, Tobacco Suit Goes to Mass Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21,1996, at 23. Additionally,
Massachusetts labelled its Good Samaritan cause of action, contained in Count 1 of its complaint,
as "Undertaking of Special Duty." Commonwealth v, Philip Morris, Inc., No. 95-7378 (complaint
at 1 66).
291 See id. (complaint).
292 Id. (complaint 1 185).
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zens.293
 The Commonwealth then asserted that the defendants breached
their "special duty" by failing to exercise reasonable care in performing
their undertaking.'" Thus, the Commonwealth's assertion of a special
duty undertaken by the defendants and the defendants' breach of that
duty satisfied the first paragraph of section 324A. 295
 The Common-
wealth next alleged the causal link between the defendants' breach
and the resulting harm, claiming that the tobacco companies' failure
to use due care in performing their undertaking increased the risk of
harm to the public and the cost of health care for the Common-
wealth , 296
The last element of a negligence claim, proof of harm, presents a
problem for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 297
 The damages that
the Commonwealth allegedly suffered as a result of the defendants'
conduct are presumably economic in nature; however, section 324A
provides liability only for physical harm. 298
 This obstacle could preclude
states' recovery from tobacco companies using a claim of negligent
performance of an undertaking. 299
V. CONCLUSION
There are endless possibilities for applying the Good Samaritan
Doctrine in the product liability arena. This tort lends itself well to
products liability cases clue to the abundance of subsidiary corpora-
tions that produce high-risk products and consumers' reliance on
manufacturers for the safety of their products. Moreover, frustrated
plaintiff's who are faced with a judgment-proof defendant now have a
viable alternative to piercing the subsidiary's corporate veil or waiting
in line with the subsidiary corporation's other creditors.
The Good Samaritan Doctrine provides equitable relief in an
equitable manner—by imposing liability based on the defendant's affir-
mative actions. Requiring individuals and corporations to use due care
when they act—regardless of whether they are bound by contract or
compensated for their services—can only be a positive step for our
293 Id. (complaint 1 186).
294 id, (complaint 1 187).
295 C0111M0111Wealtil v. Philip Morris. Inc., No. 95-7378 (complaint 11 185-88).
296 Id. (complaint 1 187). Although unclear in the complaint, the Commonwealth possibly
pled a reliance claim under § 324A(c) as well. See id. The language "above and beyond what
[health care costs] would have been had defendants not publicly represented that they were going
to engage in the undertaking" suggests an element of reliance. See id.
297 Id. (complaint 1 188).
298 ,NeeId.	 IRS) R( complaint	 —ENTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A.
299 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 324A.
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society. 304' Furthermore, mandating that parent corporations use due
care when providing assistance to their subsidiaries ensures that con-
sumers do not bear the burden of parent corporations' limited liability.
The Mahlum jury's award of ten million dollars in punitive damages is
more than just a large sum of money; it is a message that the public
refuses to let corporations escape liability for dispensing negligent
information. Armed with section 324A, litigants now have the power
to transform this morally-grounded policy into a legally enforceable
reality.
NICOLE ROSENKRANTZ
3m See Glanzer v. Shepard, 131 N.E. 275. 277 (N.Y. 1922). While requiring corporations to
use due care when providing services to their subsidiaries is clearly beneficial, whether individuals
should be bound by this rule is a murkier issue. One would think that the Good Samaritan
Doctrine would have a chilling effect on individuals. This doctrine has existed for so long,
however, that it is difficult to determine whether more Good Samaritans would emerge in its
absence. The benefits and costs of requiring the "road-side" Good Samaritan to use due care are
beyond the scope of this Note.
